Notwithstanding, some sectors are more and more unsatisfied with the news given by government authorities, as the Venezuelan leader has made no public appearance or telephone contact since his comeback last February 18.

In light of it, social psychologist Axel Capriles affirmed that rumors prop up for lack of reliable and reasonable information. “This happens when everyone hypothesizes about the reality and adds a little bit or makes his/her own construction,” he clarified.

“There is a vacuum in Venezuelans’ heads and psyches,” he explained. For 14 years, Venezuelans “have skipped not a single day waiting to see what the Venezuelan president is saying or doing.” Against such a backdrop, Capriles deems it normal that the vacuum is being filled with rumors. “If anything humans need is an answer, comprehension,” he argued.

Capriles is positive that a strained environment taking shape in the country “will compel the government to supply clear, true information.” Rumors going round could enhance “the demands of large sectors to clear the way.”

Rumors arousing emotions

Psychiatrist Roberto De Vries agrees with Capriles when saying that rumors sprout in default of appropriate information. “They hardly appear when people feel that the information levels they need have been met.”

In De Vries’ opinion, in the process of quenching the “thirst” for information, there is a quest of information that might be either false or true, or “half-false, half-true.”

De Vries, also a social communicator, emphasizes that, whatever the kind of disseminated rumors, their emergence is bound to the interest of making changes in people’s attitudes. In this regard, he infers that the main goal is exacerbating the four basic emotions: fear, rage, sadness and, to a lesser extent, joy.

Fearful population

The expert comments that rumors generally trigger fear and perhaps sort of rage and sadness. He adds that such an emotion is measured on a four-level scale related to their impact on humans and the environment.

Therefore, the specialist asserted that most of the Venezuelans touched by the tide of rumors are somewhere between levels 1 and 2. The first level is associated with the feeling of a “weird” environment, yet the subject cannot define for certain what is going on.

A “great cap kerfuffle” is underway, reported Neuman, in which leaders of Chávez’s political party are now donning the same tricolor hat they once denounced opposition candidate Henrique Capriles for wearing. Such melodrama, Neumann seemed to argue, serves as a distraction from the problems that beset Venezuelan society.

The breadth of those problems, as conveyed in Neuman’s previous coverage, is immense. As insight into the economy, he has provided vignettes of botched Christmas tree shipments and a government ice cream factory that closed down. Among other maladies, he points to a “stagnant” oil sector in need of increased production levels. Neuman’s reporting thus poses a paradox for the reader: despite “economic problems, widespread corruption, rampant crime and daily hassles”—suffered by “rich and poor alike”—Chávez has retained his “ability to convince Venezuelans that the Socialist revolution he envisions will make their lives better.”

In point of fact, Venezuelans’ lives are already better in many ways. Like countless other journalists, Neuman prefers relating anecdotes, shying away from simply reporting Venezuela’s socioeconomic trends, which are hardly in dispute among economists. Over the past 10 years, since Chávez gained control of the country’s oil revenues, Venezuela’s per capita income has grown by 2.5% a year, its unemployment has been cut in half, and free health care has been expanded to many millions as a human right—little wonder, then, that poverty has declined by 50%, absolute poverty by 70%, and infant mortality by a third. It would therefore be impossible for Neuman to relate these figures to the Times’s readership while maintaining his misleading claim that Chávez has presided over many years of “stubborn poverty.” So he just excludes them.

Even more skewed is his portrayal of Venezuela as a uniquely coercive and menacing state. Leading up to Venezuela’s elections last October, he presented as fact the unverified allegation that “[g]overnment workers are frequently required to attend pro-Chávez rallies.” His article, “Fears Persist Among Venezuelan Voters Ahead of Election,” also focused on “anxiety” over “a new electronic voting system that many Venezuelans fear might be used by the government to track those who vote against the president.” Neuman did not even hint at the findings of international observers like the Organization of American States, which have for years vouched for the integrity and security of Venezuela’s electoral procedures. In fact, the Carter Center’s report on the electronic system’s technical features concluded that “[t]he software of the voting machines guarantees the secrecy of the vote.”

In his zeal to uncover the government’s “especially potent weapon”—the “fear factor”—Neuman committed perhaps his most blatant journalistic oversight, by including the remarks by Fabiana Osteicoechea, a 22-year-old Caracas law student. “I’m not going to take the risk [of voting for opposition leader Henrique Capriles]” she said, despite being described as his “enthusiastic supporter.” She added, “I want to get a job with the government so, obviously I have to vote for Chávez.” As a quick search revealed, however, her fear of Chávez loyalists sabotaging her career had not dissuaded her from posting a photo of herself kissing a poster of Capriles on her public Twitter account.

Reassuringly, Neuman’s two most recent pieces have demonstrated his newfound ability to perform Twitter searches—the cap controversy “has given rise to plenty of jokes,” he wrote, and he included a quip from “one wag on Twitter” as an example. For his article on Friday, February 15, Neuman simply reposted two tweets from Capriles as his conclusion.

*

Neuman’s inconsistent Twitter proficiency is a minor fault compared to his newspaper’s biased presentation of the political environment in Venezuela as compared with the United States. Neuman depicts a public whose attention is diverted from deep crises by trivial posturing, like the administration’s attempt to appropriate its opponents’ symbols. Meanwhile, the government maintains a “strident foreign policy” and its leadership is populated by “yes men.”

Yet that exact portrayal could be equally applied to the United States. When the introduction to Neuman’s piece on Venezuela’s hat scandal is modified to substitute U.S. current events for Venezuelan ones, the Times’s double standards become obvious. It would be impossible for such an excoriating lead to appear in the paper:

WASHINGTON — The United States seems to lurch from one crisis to another. A recently leaked memo shows that the Obama administration has granted itself the legal authority to perform extrajudicial assassinations of U.S. citizens. Last week, a study found that over a quarter of the world’s countries participated in a CIA-led program of global kidnapping, torture, and detention. On February 9, the First Lady attended the funeral of shooting victim Hadiya Pendleton, 15, as the government struggles to address the over 11,000 gun-related homicides a year. The unemployment rate has stubbornly hovered near 8%, and lurid murders are the stuff of daily headlines.

But high on the list of government priorities was an unexpected item: skeet shooting.

This final item, of course, refers to Obama’s recent comments about shooting clay pigeons “all the time” in the midst of his effort to ban assault rifles. Five days later, responding to press requests, the White House disseminated a photo of the president firing a shotgun. The effort nevertheless failed to curry favor with gun owners who opposed his legislative proposals.

It is obvious there is little substantive difference between a politician wearing a cap styled like his opponent’s, and a politician posturing as a shooting enthusiast, given each country’s context. But, as it did with Venezuelan cap wearing, would the Times treat as a distraction Obama’s unsuccessful bid to insinuate himself into the good graces of opponents to gun control? Of course not.

Rather than write a short, bemused piece on the “absurdity” of this “political theater,” Times reporters instead conducted scrupulous “database searches of Mr. Obama’s speeches and interviews,” finding “no mention” of Obama’s use of Camp David’s skeet-shooting range in their 1,000-word story on the issue. Other newspapers covered it with even greater fervor. The Washington Post dedicated 950 words on page A2 of its newspaper, and another 1,700-word fact-check piece on its website; USA Today printed six different pundits’ views on the matter.

The major news outlets’ frenzy over this nonissue contributed to its heightened public profile—to such an extent that it attained a similar level of newsworthiness as the Obama administration’s legal justifications for killing its own citizens. On February 10, the date on which Neuman’s “cap kerfuffle” article appeared, Google News searches showed that Obama’s shooting of clay pigeons had prompted 95% as many news results as his Justice Department’s memo authorizing drone killings. [The phrase "obama drone memo" returned the highest number of news results out of a pool of related search terms, as did "obama skeet shoot."]

*

Setting aside the media’s general obsession over drivel, the Times’s differing treatment of Venezuela and the United States conforms to its pattern of criticizing the governance of countries deemed enemies of the United States, while providing much more docile coverage of domestic leadership. Thus, New York Times contributors, as well as its editorial board, have railed against the “authoritarian” behavior of Chávez (and of Ecuador’s president, Rafael Correa). But the newspaper is guaranteed never to describe Obama as a “strongman,” an “autocrat” or an “authoritarian” as he arrogates to himself the radical power to secretly kill any U.S. citizen without due process—even, possibly, on U.S. soil.

Similarly, Neuman’s news stories in the Times characterize Venezuelan foreign policy as “strident” and “contentious,” but the paper does not use such language when reporting on U.S. foreign policy—even as South African Nobel Peace Prize winner Desmond Tutu, in a letter to the Times, speaks on behalf of “those of us who live in the rest of the world” in condemning Washington’s international drone-assassination program.

Finally, the headline to an article by Neuman described Chávez’s vice president as a “yes man,” and the piece reported critics’ claims that new government employees are judged “by their loyalty” to Chávez. But the Times included no derogatory words in its reporting toward Obama’s Justice Department, which drafted the leaked assassination memo. Such language would be warranted, however. As constitutional law expert Glenn Greenwald argues, this secret memo is obviously “the by-product of obsequious lawyers telling their Party’s leader that he is (of course) free to do exactly that which he wants to do.”

The newspaper’s reporting reinforces attitudes that Latin American politics can be little more than a primitive charade, starring authoritarian leaders and a hoodwinked public, punctuated by risible distractions. Thankfully—at least within the world of New York Times coverage—the “political theater of the absurd” isn’t “commonplace” here at home.

In the chess game of the United Socialist Party of Venezuela (PSUV), Diosdado Cabello has lost several pieces these days. The last official gazettes have been warning that some of his closest collaborators have been dismissed from their strategic positions. Viz his brother-in-law Rafael Contreras Hernández who was in charge of Bolivariana de Aeropuertos until January 8 of the current year, by order of the Ministry of Air and Water Transport.

A removal also took place in the State Railway Institute (IFE): the first one to get dismissed was its president, Franklin Pérez Colina, who has publicly stated that his partnership with Cabello started back in 1992. The very Speaker of the National Assembly put him in charge of the million railway  projects and he remained in such position for more than three years until last January 3, when his dismissal was shown on the Official Gazette.

It was the Vice President of the Republic who ordered his dismissal. Since he took over the presidency, Nicolas Maduro has appointed only one person, and we are precisely speaking of the Minister of Land Transport, Juan García Toussaintt, who has been designated as acting President of the IFE, in replacement of the one appointed by Cabello before leaving the Ministry of Public Works.

The truth lying behind the pictures, the hugs and the handshakes is that everyone is taking advantage for their own benefit. Otherwise, Deputy Ismael García does not comprehend how Darío Vivas appeared as the second in command at the National Assembly.

“On January 4, we all witnessed that Diosdado Cabello had announced Darío Vivas’s comeback, who now shares the leadership position of the board of directors with Pedro Carreño and Blanca Eekhout; Pedro came that day very well dressed wearing his Vuitton tie, and what happened?” García wonders. “Nicolás Maduro imposed one of his important pieces in order to bring balance.

The comeback of Foreign Minister Jaua
Around Chávez, there are movements which go from hardcore collectives of low-income Caracas’ barrio January 23 to what they baptized in their own group as the endogenous right. García, who also gravitated towards this orbit until 2007, points out that it is wrong to suppose that the United Socialist Party of Venezuela has solely rearranged in a civilian wing led by Maduro and in another wing of military nature represented by Cabello.

With no conductor, Deputy García defines the PSUV as a “group federation.” It is some sort of an alliance of several factions with apportionment of positions and power share. In fact, by the end of 2009, he already denounced four different associations involved in the so-called financial centrifuge, which finished in bankruptcy and placement in receivership of 11 banks.

In those days, he indicated that the then Minister of Public Works, Diosdado Cabello, held an important position in one of the groups. On another spot, he put Barinas Governor, Adán Chávez, together with businessmen like Ricardo Fernández Barrueco, who was precisely behind the bars at that time. He also indicated Jesse Chacón in another clan in company with his brother Arné, who has been just released from jail, and finally, he pointed out that former Vice President José Vicente Rangel was a leading figure of another conglomerate, which counted on business people like the current fugitive Pedro Torres Ciliberto.

Many of these representatives continue exerting a great deal of influence; however, there are also other stockholders at the moment, who should be added when joining efforts. Some of them are: Freddy Bernal, Jorge Rodríguez, Jesse Chacón and Erika Faría.

Elías Jaua also belongs to the aforementioned group. Between 2010 and 2012, he was first seen in the cabinet with strategic allies such as Juan Carlos Loyo, Eduardo Samán and Richard Canán from the Ministries of Trade, and Agriculture and Lands. Subsequent to his recent comeback as a Foreign Minister and Vice President for Political Affairs, he is placed in the PSUV as ideologically closer to Maduro than Cabello; nevertheless, at this time, there is no other option but to smile together in front of the cameras.

Ramírez’s checkbook
Rafael Ramírez is also on the spotlight. He has managed oil holding Pdvsa since 2004. If anyone overlooked a detail, at the beginning of the current year, he was among the few people invited by Raúl Castro to take part in what several media agencies have called the Pact of the Havana. This pact is composed of the following members: Vice President Nicolas Maduro; National Assembly’s Speaker Diosdado Cabello; Solicitor General Cilia Flores; Barinas state Governor, Adán Chávez, and Minister of Science and Technology Jorge Arreaza.

While the meeting was held privately in the Havana; back in Caracas, Maduro and Cabello were seen working together in the inspection of a state-led company, with the intention to clarify that there exists no division among the two of them.

Former Deputy José Albornoz, who also supported Chávez’s project until 2010, believes that Maduro, Cabello and the rest of leaders of the PSUV have no other option but to work together, although behind the scenes, they continue to be in a power struggle that can be easily seen in the appointments and destitutions like the one seen in the State Railway Institute. “That is the way to win at chess,” he says. “When someone plays chess, they put their pawns forward and protect their bishops.”

The Arias Cárdenas factor
Maduro is known to be a former member of the Socialist League. He started as a labor union delegate in Caracas Subway, and he has climbed positions in the Government in company with Solicitor General Cilia Flores, former Vice President José Vicente Rangel, Deputies Fernando Soto Rojas and Darío Vivas, and Minister of Electrical Energy Héctor Navarro, who has been appointed –not in vain- as the acting Vice President during Maduro’s visits to Cuba.

Diosdado Cabello, for his part, made his first appearance on February 4, 1992 and on the road, he has been seen closely related to fomer treasurer Alejandro Andrade; former Minister of Basic Industries and Mining Rodolfo Sanz; Deputy Pedro Carreño; President of the Commission for the Administration of Currency Exchange (Cadivi), Manuel Barroso, and his own brother, José David Cabello, who is in charge of the National Integrated Service for the Administration of Custom Duties and Taxes (Seniat).

José Albornoz, from the Venezuelan Progressive Movement, indicates that the Speaker of the National Assembly does not only count on the military power attributed to him, but he also counts on business people and figures from the Government strategically established in both Infrastructure and Finances fields.

In the same sense, lawyer Rocío San Miguel comments from NGO Citizen‘s Control, that Cabello’s clout on the National Armed Forces (FAN) is a myth: “In these 14 years, he has created work teams in order to get benefits from the public administration in which active military officers participate, this attributes him no power or clout in the FAN whatsoever.”

San Miguel believes that the role played by the 10 military Governors, voted in the PSUV electoral roll, will be quite relevant in the time ahead. Among them, one in particular calls attention: Zulia state Governor. “I would say that Arias Cárdenas is the most influential retired military officer inside both the chavist and the non-chavist national armed forces at this time, especially in the Army,” she claims.

Neither Arias Cárdenas nor any of the other 19 chavist governors can be disregarded. Albornoz points out that they belong to the political structure that Chávez set, in case he was not able to take back office. In such rearrangement, everyone is in a power struggle. Not in vain, Maduro appeared on January 8, in a mandatory nationwide radio and television broadcast showing a video conference in company with the Military High Command. “That mandatory nationwide broadcast was not intended for us, but for power sectors inside the Chávezism instead,” Albornoz concludes.

Venezuela’s President Hugo Chavez smiles at supporters during a campaign rally in Propatria neighborhood, Caracas, Venezuela, Sept. 17, 2012. Venezuela’s presidential election is scheduled for Oct. 7.
Ariana Cubillos / AP

During his 14 years in power, Hugo Chávez has built a reputation as one of the most aggressive and effective campaigners in the hemisphere, easily winning his last three elections. “Hurricane Hugo” was known for his energetic, back-slapping style that had him plunging into throngs of supporters and electrifying crowds.

This year, however, his campaign seems to have been downgraded to a tropical storm, as Chávez, 58, has kept most appearances tightly scripted and, for the most part, close to the Miraflores presidential palace.

On Monday, he briefly high-fived supporters and hugged a baby in southern Caracas before climbing onto the red campaign truck that has been a prominent feature of his rallies.

“We’re going to give the bourgeoisie a historic lesson,” he said, as thousands of supporters cheered him on.

But with less than three weeks before the country’s crucial Oct. 7 vote, even a low-intensity Chávez is proving he can inflict serious damage.

In the last few weeks, Chávez opponent in the race, Henrique Capriles, 40, has had to face aggressive government supporters and almost daily accusations. The barrage began early this month, when a former ally produced a document that he said proved Capriles was bent on rolling out punishing economic reforms. The campaign denied the charges and said the papers were forgeries straight from the Chávez dirty-tricks machine. But it put Capriles on the defensive.

Days later, emboldened Chávez supporters forced Capriles to cancel an appearance in Caracas. They followed up by barring him from the airport in Puerto Cabello and burning one of his campaign trucks.

“It’s safe to say that the government has entered the negative phase of the campaign,” said Herbert Koeneke, a political science professor at Simon Bolivar University, who sees a hint of desperation in the acts. “I think it’s evidence that, within the government, there’s fear [of losing].”

The biggest blow to Capriles came last week, with the release of grainy video of Juan Carlos Caldera, one of his closest advisors, taking money from an anonymous donor and offering to set up a meeting with the candidate. Caldera said the money wasn’t intended for Capriles but his own mayoral bid, but the ruling PSUV party has called for an investigation suggesting Capriles is being backed by shadowy forces.

Capriles expelleed Caldera from his coalition, but the incident has generated doubts in corruption-weary Venezuela.

Hernando Ramirez, a Caracas construction worker, said the opposition had a chance at victory until it was “pummeled” by the scandal. “It’s shameful,” he said. “The president is going to win again.”

While most polls give Chávez a comfortable lead, the opposition dismisses many of the studies as government propaganda. Even so, one of the most respected pollsters, Datanalisis, gives Chávez 46.8 percent of the vote versus Capriles’ 34.3 percent. The Datanalisis numbers have been widely reported in the local press, but the company will not confirm the proprietary information. Consultores 21, another closely watched pollster, however, predicts a much tighter race, giving Capriles a thin lead with 47.7 percent of the vote versus Chávez’s 45.9 percent.

A former tank commander, Chávez is used to rolling over rivals — not being forced into hand-to-hand combat. During the last election, in 2006, he won 62.8 percent of the vote versus Manuel Rosales’ 37 percent.

But this year is different. The president’s attempts to blame previous administrations for soaring crime, double-digit inflation and food shortages are ringing hollow after holding the top job since 1999.

In addition, Chávez entered this race as he was recovering from an undisclosed form of cancer. While he claims he has completely overcome the illness, his appearances are usually confined to television studios or podiums high above the crowd, which have many speculating that he’s watching his health as carefully as his campaign.

Over the weekend, during one of his few campaign stop outside of Caracas, in San Fernando de Apure in central Venezuela, Chávez nearly wept as he rattled off all the towns he would like to visit.

“But as you know, I can’t walk the streets of San Fernando and I can’t make that trip right now,” he told thousands of supporters. He went on to ask God to give him a chance to be “free as the wind” for a few years, after he finished remaking the nation.

Chávez says he needs another six-year term to cement the gains of his 21st Century Socialist Revolution. He’s pledged to step up his trademark social programs — they include free housing and health care — increase minimum wage and strengthen the country’s ties with China.

He may be right to double down on his policies. Many surveys show Chávez with approval ratings in excess of 50 percent. And he still has a rabid core of supporters.

Yoander Vasquez, 25, works at a government-owned cement plant in Monagas state, where Chávez won 71 percent of the vote in 2006.

As Vasquez struggled to explain Chávez’s appeal, he finally compared him to a former Colombian drug kingpin.

“Chávez is like Pablo Escobar,” he said. “He’s simply fearless…The opposition will never win here again.”

The president routinely denigrates Capriles, who he calls a “mediocre boot-licker,” and says he won’t stoop to having a televised debate with him. He warns that Capriles wants to gut social spending and roll out a wave of neoliberal economic reforms that would lead to chaos and might even spark a civil war.

Last week, Chávez blamed Capriles’ campaigning in government strongholds for the recent street violence.

“Where does this violence come from historically speaking? From the bourgeoisie,” Chávez said. “They only defend democracy when it’s convenient.”

The president has also raised fears of a foreign destabilization campaign. In August, Chávez announced the arrest of a U.S. citizen and former marine, who he said may be a “mercenary” bent on disrupting the elections. Early this month, authorities detained a U.S. flagged boat in the port of Maracaibo on arms-trafficking suspicions. The sailors were eventually released without charges, but the investigation into the “mercenary” is ongoing.

Capriles is trying to stay above the fray. Campaigning in Barquisimetro, in northwestern Venezuela on Friday, he asked Chávez not to drag the country into his “swamp.”

“End the dirty war and the insults,” he said, “because what we’re building, with our own hands and lots of effort and work, is something big and beautiful — the Venezuela of the future.”

But the opposition is bracing its supporters for more surprises.

“We’re going to see new videos, new [breaks in the ranks] and the government wants to impose violence,” Ismael García, an opposition congressman, told Globovisión on Sunday. “The desperation of their acts demonstrates that they’re losing the election.”

Like any good strategist, Chávez has been cryptic about the final phase of his campaign, only saying that it would be “multi-pronged” and “creative.” If he has any doubts about victory, he’s savvy enough not to admit them in public.

“When that mediocre guy gets into the ring he’s not going to last one round,” Chávez predicted recently. “It’s going to be a devastating knockout.”

Read more here: http://www.miamiherald.com/2012/09/18/v-fullstory/3009091/venezuelas-hurricane-hugo-may.html#storylink=cpy

Neither production by state-owned factories nor government-funded imports have helped bridge the gap between supply and demand (File photo)

In today’s Venezuela, a nation run on the premises of “Socialism of the 21st Century,” acquiring a brand-new car is an ominous task. Hundreds of keen car buyers fall short because of limited supply on hand at dealers and state-operated networks.

A few years ago, President Hugo Chávez scoffed at “how sad” it is that most young professionals think of getting a new car as soon as they graduate. “That is part of the poison brimming from the old society,” argued Chávez.

On January 21, hundreds of customers gathered outside state company Suministros Industriales Venezolanos (Suvinca) to get their hands on one of the 9,400 Chery vehicles imported by that organization. “We want cars!” chanted the crowd as an official assured them that no more vehicles were available.

Private dealers face similar scenarios. Waiting lists for a Chevrolet, Ford or Toyota model may extend for over six months.

Government-party representative Elvis Amoroso has dusted off a draft law initially brought to light in 2009 in an attempt to put an end to distortion within the automotive sector.

The automotive industry and its dealers worry that new laws like those proposed by Amoroso would actually make a bad situation worse. Conversely, they warn that state intervention has been one of the causes for distortion.

According to data published by the Venezuelan Automotive Chamber, Cavenez, in 2012 a total of 104,083 vehicles were assembled in the country. This represents only 40.97% of the installed capacity of the seven privately owned companies.

Last year’s result is not isolated. In fact, a retrospective view of production shows that from 2007 to 2012 production plunged 39.6%, falling from 172,418 assembled units to only 104,000 in 2012.

This slump in domestic production, however, coincides with the 2008 implementation of “automotive policies,” a series of regulations created by the government to “strengthen” the industry.

“Why do they put a stranglehold on the industry by making access to foreign currency sluggish? Why would delivery of non-production certificates or permits for Imported Vehicle-Assembly Materials undergo such delays? Why would imports be shut down?” asked a top director of an assembly company, who opted to remain anonymous as a result of the hassles his organization has faced since the launch of automotive policies.

The state’s role

In addition to restrictions faced by assembly companies, the government has also shut down imports for a few years now by limiting them to trade agreements entered into with allied countries, such as China or Ecuador.

Those 9,400 Chery cars, imported by Suvinca, make the state the largest importer for that particular market, not taking into account transactions made by other state organizations. Makes like Nissan, Honda, Renault or Fiat, to name a few, have had to face years without being able to obtain permits or only receiving marginal amounts to meet domestic demand.

Nevertheless, neither those cars nor those produced by state-owned assembly companies like Venirauto and Corporación ZGT (responsible for assembling Chery cars in Venezuela) have translated into consumer satisfaction.

Poor production levels and limited imports have widened the gap between actual supply and demand. In 2012, 130,533 cars were sold, only 52% of the 250,000 experts believe the Venezuelan market requires.

No irregularities acknowledged

The void between supply and demand has given way to market distortions and has turned vehicles into investment assets.

Amoroso has accused automotive companies of running mafias perpetrating all sorts of illegal transactions. Nevertheless, Ford Motor de Venezuela issued a statement indicating that it sells vehicles “only” through its formal dealer network and that it conducts its business “in accordance with” consumer protection laws.

In addition, the company warned that it “does not offer new or low-mileage” cars through its employees or third parties “other than its dealers.”

Venezuelans compare President Hugo Chavez to Jesus Christ. Photo: Bloomberg.

In the nature and the suffering of what may be his impending death, Hugo Chavez will probably achieve the immortality in human memory that he has always sought, the certainty of a veneration reserved for saints, martyrs and redeemers.

The images appearing in the streets of Venezuela leave no doubt about it. They don’t compare Chavez to Simon Bolivar – the inspiration of the nation’s “comandante” – but to Jesus Christ. And there are explicit slogans displayed that go further and deeper into Venezuelan reality: “The people are Chavez” and “We are all Chavez” – like some modern miracle of transubstantiation.

It is possible that the ruling government of Cuba (where the Venezuelan is in hospital) may try to preserve the authority of a moribund Chavez, like the famous Spanish Cid Campeador, whose body – strapped to his horse – led troops in a victorious battle. But it is much more likely that, after a protracted and agonising struggle with cancer, Chavez’s death will be announced.

And a broad portion of the Venezuelan people will be plunged into mourning. Something similar happened in the case of Eva Peron, the heroine of the Argentine poor, when she died suddenly of cancer at 33. She was instantly sanctified and continues to be so.

There are various scenarios for the future of Venezuela, and none of them is certain. It is most likely that the mourning for Chavez will last for months and will be followed by a new national election, which will be won by a “Chavista” candidate, a supporter of Chavez.

The decisive emotions will be grief coupled with the gratitude that many Venezuelans, especially the poor, feel for Chavez and his social policies. And the electoral, financial judicial and partly legislative organs of the state will continue to be controlled by the Chavista movement. The favoured candidate would be Nicolas Maduro, already anointed by Chavez.

In the period of mourning, Venezuela will live with the fiction of “Chavismo without Chavez”. His portrait in his days of glory, his empty presidential chair, his televised image will be retransmitted and, for a time, will continue to accompany the new president.

But for all religions, sacred and secular, and for the very nature of humanity, mourning always comes to an end. And all Venezuelans – Chavistas and non-Chavistas – will awaken to a severe economic predicament that can’t be ignored. It happened in the Soviet Union in 1989. It will definitely happen in Cuba. It will happen in Venezuela.

The evidence is in the public domain, and it is alarming. The Venezuelan economy shows a deficit of $70 billion (R629bn), 22 percent of gross domestic product. The official monetary exchange rate is 4.3 bolivars (R8.98) to the dollar, but on the black market it is 18 bolivars.

For years, the inflation rate has been the highest in the region. Domestic shortages have become almost a tradition in Venezuela, due to the dismantling of industry, agriculture, animal husbandry (practically all productive activities except petroleum extraction), the exodus of many middle-class professionals and the lack of private investment, internal or external.

Only in 2012 was there an improvement in the continual shortages of many goods and services, but at an extremely high cost, when the Chavez government purchased all sorts of products to grease the votes of its partisans. Venezuela is now suffering an acute shortage of available cash. How can an economy be in such a grave condition when Venezuela has registered more than $800bn in oil sales?

Much of the explanation lies in the handling of all this oil. In 1998, Venezuela was producing 3.3 million barrels of oil a day. The country was exporting 2.7 million barrels a day and reaping the profits. Production has now fallen to 2.4 million, and only 900 000 barrels – exported daily to the US (the hated “empire”) – is now directly paid for.

With the rest: About 800 000 barrels are consumed internally (so cheaply as to be almost free, and stimulating a lucrative black-market trade in illegal exports); 300 000 go directly to China, as payment for products and the repayment of loans; 100 000 barrels are allocated for the importation of petrol; and 300 000 to various Caribbean countries that pay (when they do pay) at huge discounts and very protracted terms of payment.

Or they pay – like Cuba, which receives 100 000 barrels daily – with a supply of medical, educational and police personnel. (Cuba benefits so amply from Venezuelan oil that it actually exports some of its received supplies.) Venezuelan oil profits have shrunk by a third since the Chavez government came to power.

Amid the mourning for Chavez, or immediately afterward, a Chavista president will have to confront this reality and explain it to the Venezuelan people. But this president won’t be Chavez himself, the hypnotic Chavez, Chavez the magician, Chavez the leader who used to explain everything, justify and muffle everything.

It is likely that the reaction will be the typical one within Latin American political culture. The people will react with indignation. They will blame the Chavista government for not being at the level of their former leader and representative. They will say that Chavez wouldn’t have permitted this, Chavez would have prevented it. It will be the end of “Chavismo without Chavez”. And a great opportunity for the opposition.

In the last election, the Venezuelan opposition, after long years of errors and inconsistencies, united among themselves and chose an intelligent and courageous leader in Henrique Capriles. He lost to Chavez but did very well, winning almost 7 million votes.

During Chavez’s physical decline and suffering, the opposition has continued to be critical of the government yet has also showed a noteworthy prudence. And it has done well to do so. Any overflow of vindictive or triumphant passions would be taken as a provocation and lead directly to violence.

If the opposition, after so much time, preserves its cohesion and energy, it could show further gains in the next national elections and recoup its losses, especially once the period of mourning has ended. And this awakening could well be supported by a force of protest that has now somewhat waned but remains latent, that of the Venezuelan students who played a crucial role in defeating a 2007 referendum that would have openly converted Venezuela to the Cuban model of government.

At stake is not only the economic recuperation of a country that has an ocean of largely wasted oil, but the normalisation of democracy, which has been sequestered for almost 14 years by Chavez’s policies of political “redemption”. At stake is the fundamental possibility of contentious groups living together in a society that has been torn apart by discord, intolerance and a propaganda of hatred, by a devotion to an absolute binomial: friend versus enemy.

Few Latin-American governments have shown such devotion to this distinction. Once the mourning for Chavez has ended, it would be best if this distinction were to vanish from the political scene. Only then can Venezuelans arrive at reconciliation.

The attitude of these states apparently explains their prompt acceptance of the premise that Chávez’s government is a continuation of his previous term of office, which has been backed by a Supreme Court decision. However, some countries have hinted that it would be better if new elections were called to legitimise the new order.

“Criticisms from the opposition in Venezuela and from a large number of legal experts, contending that the steps taken are contrary to the constitution, have not been echoed by any country,” Carlos Romero, a professor of postgraduate studies in political science and international relations at several Venezuelan universities, told IPS.

Elsa Cardozo, head of the School of Liberal Studies at the Metropolitan University in Caracas, held similar views. The countries of the hemisphere “are witnessing a situation that is obviously not normal, but they prefer to wait and let time pass, while saying that it is not up to them to interpret the Venezuelan constitution,” she told IPS.

The first aspect of the situation, said Cardozo, is that the re-elected president is seriously ill and is undergoing treatment for cancer. He is convalescing in Havana from his fourth surgery since June 2011.

Chávez was re-elected in October to his fourth term of office, and was due to be sworn in on Jan. 10. Instead, Nicolás Maduro, the vice president (who, in Venezuela, is appointed by the president rather than elected by popular vote), inaugurated the six-year term with the tacit blessing of the Supreme Court, accompanied by the previous cabinet of ministers, while the single-chamber legislature declined to declare the president absent.

If the legislature had declared the president absent, the speaker of the Venezuelan parliament, Diosdado Cabello, would have taken over as interim president and new presidential elections would have been called immediately.

In contrast, according to the ruling of the Supreme Court and the view of parliament, there is no deadline for Chávez’s swearing-in as president for the 2013-2019 term.

Cardozo said, “Foreign countries do not buy the idea that there is no deadline. Spokespersons from Brazil, Colombia and the United States have said that as soon as advisable, if President Chávez is unable to return to his post, elections should be called.”

In her view, the United States particularly will maintain “a low profile” with respect to Venezuela, because “it clearly understands that for a number of (reasons), its words could well be counterproductive.”

Romero agrees with Cardozo that “with the start of new government terms in the United States and Venezuela”, Washington’s priorities are aimed rather at reestablishing diplomatic relations at ambassador level and “a climate of normality, so that U.S. capital can participate in the oil industry and the countries can work together against drug trafficking.”

As for Latin America and the Caribbean, the experts concur that there is no uniform position with respect to the situation in Venezuela.

Romero divides countries into three groups. The first is made up of the closest political allies, like Cuba, Bolivia, Ecuador and Uruguay “that explicitly support continuity and the consolidation of Chávez’s policies, and believe there should be no going back on the changes effected so far.”

“A second group – the majority – whose most visible exponents are Argentina, Brazil, Colombia and Peru, do not necessarily support Chavist domestic and international policies, but they do not want any kind of disorder, nor for the president’s absence to cause political instability or military unrest,” he said.

Street protests against the government formula led by Maduro have been few and far between, mounted almost exclusively by groups of students, while armed forces commanders have stated that they will not only obey, but will also enforce, the decisions of parliament and the Supreme Court.

According to Romero, the third group is comprised of “countries that wash their hands” of the whole business. “They do not have marked affinity or common interests with the Chávez administration, but they prefer to keep quiet rather than act, and this group includes Guatemala, Panama, Mexico and Chile,” he said.

Attending a mass rally held Jan. 10 in front of the presidential palace, presidents Evo Morales of Bolivia, Daniel Ortega of Nicaragua, Desiré Delano Bouterse of Suriname and José Mujica of Uruguay, along with high-level representatives of Argentina, Cuba, Ecuador, El Salvador, Haiti and St. Vincent and the Grenadines showed their support for the continuity of the mandate and for Maduro’s leadership.

Later on, messages acknowledging the Venezuelan government leadership formula arrived from all over the continent. The official line, without there ever having been an official medical bulletin about his state of health, is that Chávez, convalescing in Havana, continues “in the full exercise of his functions” as president, while his reinauguration for a new term of office is pending.

Meanwhile, Maduro is in practice the head of government, but although he receives recognition as such, he refuses to be called the acting or interim president.

A kind of collegial government is operating, with consultations and joint public appearances by Maduro, Cabello, Rafael Ramírez, president of the state oil company PDVSA, and Elías Jaua, foreign minister and former vice president.

Completing the political scenario, the leaders closest to Chávez, especially those in public office, travel continually to Havana where, according to their reports, they visit the ailing president, and also meet with historic Cuban leader Fidel Castro, his brother Cuban president Raúl Castro, and several ministers.

Among those who have travelled to Havana in order to gain first-hand information about the situation in Venezuela are Argentine president Cristina Fernández, Peruvian president Ollanta Humala, and Marco Aurélio García, the influential foreign policy adviser to Brazilian president Dilma Rousseff.

Brazilian officials told the press that the Rousseff administration has suggested that Venezuelan leaders hold elections “as soon as possible” if Chávez dies or becomes incapable of carrying out his presidential functions.

On Jan. 17, Brazilian foreign minister Antonio Patriota said: “We trust the situation in Venezuela, whatever the outcome, will evolve according to the institutions with minimal shock, so that Venezuelan society can reorganise itself as quickly as possible.”

Outgoing U.S. Secretary of State Hillary Rodham Clinton met with Colombian Foreign Minister María Ángela Holguín in Washington on Jan. 15, and they concluded that “a political transition of any kind needs to happen in accordance with the Venezuelan constitution and needs to be democratic”, according to the state department spokeswoman.

A few days later, Holguín came to Caracas for talks with Maduro and Jaua about joint programmes for the development of border areas, she said, and to wish Chávez a speedy recovery, but she did not refer to any “transition” in Venezuela.

Maduro and Jaua will be able to gauge regional perceptions of the Venezuelan situation more directly and privately when they attend the summit of the Community of Latin American and Caribbean States (CELAC) and the European Union-CELAC summit, to be held in Santiago de Chile Jan. 25-27.

Now with President Hugo Chavez battling for his life, the stance of the 134,000-strong armed forces again will be crucial.

Divisions within the military have clouded attempts to determine who it might support among Chavez loyalists or if it would side with the opposition. While the military’s leadership is packed with Chavez supporters, the officer corps may not be so loyal. Much will depend on what Chavez’s political heirs do in the coming weeks.

Experts and former military officers agree that the governing duo of Vice President Nicolas Maduro and National Assembly President Diosdado Cabello has been unable to fill the leadership vacuum created by Chavez’s five-week absence and silence. Without a commander in chief, there is no one to ensure unity or guarantee continued loyalty through promotions and retirements.

Retired army Gen. Antonio Rivero was one of the first to sound the alarm about the leadership gap when he told the Venezuelan news website Noticias24 that if Chavez didn’t return from Cuba for his Jan. 10 swearing-in, the armed forces from that point on would “not have a commander in chief.” He’s since gone into hiding after state intelligence agents came to his house looking for him. He said in an interview that he had sparked government ire by accusing it of letting Cubans influence the military.

Maduro, for his part, has repeatedly tried to put to rest any questions about the military’s loyalties by rallying troops and publicly appearing alongside top brass.

On Wednesday, the vice president celebrated the supposed support of hundreds of soldiers gathered at the Fort Tiuna military base in Caracas. At the end of the televised speech, a band struck up a Venezuelan folk song and soldiers clapped in time to the lyrics “Onward, commander!”

“(Chavez) told us to transmit from his heart to the Bolivarian national armed forces all his appreciation for so much loyalty toward him as a humble soldier of this country,” Maduro said. “Thanks to everybody for so much loyalty and for so much love.”

Opposition leader Henrique Capriles has also trumpeted his military ties, announcing last week in a news conference that he has been in touch with officers and suggested they would step in to ensure leaders follow the country’s laws governing what should happen in a transition.

The military, like the rest of the country, is in limbo, awaiting the outcome of Chavez’s fourth cancer surgery.

Government officials have insisted they can indefinitely postpone the president’s swearing-in, which the constitution had set for Jan. 10, as long as he’s physically incapacitated. Opposition leaders say the move is unconstitutional although it was ratified by the Supreme Court.

“The Armed Force also has a role to play here … of respecting the constitution,” Capriles said during a news conference.

Throughout his 14 years in power, Chavez has proved masterful at commandeering support both inside and outside the military. With his natural political touch and ramped-up public aid programs, Chavez has easily won re-election three times, including in October when he defeated Capriles with 55 percent of the vote.

Since taking office in 1999, Chavez has attempted to transform the rank and file into defenders of his socialist-inspired policies. After a 2002 coup that included rebellious soldiers briefly dislodged him from power, Chavez returned to the presidential palace only after loyalists within the military stepped in to put down the uprising, and he subsequently promoted allies.

Chavez also has defended officers accused by the U.S. of drug trafficking and blasted what he’s said is fabricated evidence against them.

Chavez’s government is replete with military brass, including seven of 29 Cabinet ministers. When Chavez’s allies swept the country’s gubernatorial elections in December, 11 of the country’s 23 governorships ended up in the hands of former military officers allied with the president.

If he dies or otherwise leaves power, the country’s constitution requires an election be called within 30 days to replace him, which could unleash a power struggle.

What may ultimately guide the transition is the complex mix of loyalties among both top leadership and lower-ranking officers, said Rocio San Miguel, president of the nonprofit group Citizen Control for Security, Defense and the Armed Force.

A former paratrooper, Chavez enjoys explicit support from his two top military leaders, Defense Minister Adm. Diego Molero and chief strategic operational officer, army Gen. Wilmer Barrientos, both of whom the president appointed.

Cabello, who’s a close Chavez ally and former army lieutenant, can also count on officers promoted by the country’s main military academy around 1987, the year of his class. Retired Adm. Ivan Carratu estimated more than 85 men from that class, out of hundreds of high-ranking officers, are serving in command posts around the country.

But while the top leadership is solidly pro-Chavez, the loyalties of some 8,500 to 10,000 middle- and low-ranking officers remain unknown, San Miguel said, and they could determine the military’s posture.

“We are clearly in a transition in Venezuela and what’s to be defined is what is the real alternative to power, first within Chavismo and secondly, with regard to the opposition’s aspirations,” San Miguel said.

Opposition politicians insist that many in the armed forces are unhappy with Chavez for introducing Cuban officials among their ranks and for failing to improve soldiers’ low wages and poor benefits.

Carratu told The Associated Press that more than 100 officers, largely colonels, have been kept out of active duty after being identified as unsympathetic to Chavez’s policies. He added that the authorities hope to retire many of them after two years out of active duty.

Carratu said another batch of officers is not aligned with any political movement and consider themselves loyal only to the constitution.

“There exists a group of soldiers … where what’s totally and absolutely important is the army,” Carratu said. “It’s where there isn’t visible authority.”

Another question complicating any transition is a 125,000 person-strong civilian militia that the Chavez government has cultivated as a shadow army defending his programs. San Miguel estimated that about 30,000 of them could be considered armed combatants.

Under the command of a Chavez-appointed army general, the militia represents “a threat to the civilian population that decides to protest peacefully,” she said.

At least for now, the military appears to be playing its historic part by ensuring peace, said Diego Moya-Ocampos, a political analyst with the London-based economic consultancy IHS Global Insight.

“There are tensions behind the scenes but not strong enough yet to fragment the armed forces.”

San Miguel, however, suggested the military simply may be waiting until the president’s departure to make any move, as are all the players in Venezuela’s post-Chavez chess game.

When will it finally reveal its plans? “Not until there’s a real alternative of power,” San Miguel said.

Globovision

To back up their claim, HRW can only find two cases to cite. The first is the opening up of an administrative investigation into pro-opposition TV station Globovision by national telecommunications regulator Conatel on 9 January. The investigation relates to a set of Globovision-made short spots questioning the legality of the delay in President Hugo Chavez’s inauguration, through quoting certain excerpts from the Venezuelan constitution and comments by government figures. Conatel argues that the spots, whose continued broadcasting is prohibited, may have broken article 27 of Venezuela’s Media Responsibility Law, which prevents media outlets from producing information that “generates public anxiety or disturbs public order, acts against the stability of the democratic system, denies the authority of the legitimately constituted authorities, or generates hate or intolerance for political or religious reasons”.

HRW dismiss Conatel’s claim out of hand, with HRW Americas director José Miguel Vivanco quoted as saying, “There is nothing in the content of Globovisión’s broadcasts that could remotely be described as incitement or a threat to public order”. As such, Conatel’s investigation is made to appear as petty and aimed at censoring what is supposedly only a case of a media outlet questioning the government line.

However, both the content of the spots and the political context in which they were produced make HRW’s description of the situation highly contestable. For example, one of the spots begins by showing President Chavez commenting before he went to Cuba for surgery in December that if he is unable to continue as president, new elections should be called. Then, the spot goes on to quote and underline the first half of article 231 of the constitution, which states that a president elect should be sworn-in for their new term on the 10 January after their election.

The spot then moves on to quote one paragraph of article 233 of the constitution which says “when a permanent absence (of the president) is produced before assuming office (i.e. before the inauguration ceremony), a new election must be held within thirty days”. The spot ends by quoting another part of article 233, which states that in such a case, the president of the National Assembly must assume the presidency while a new election is held.

Through focusing on the 10 January swearing-in date, then quoting the constitutional article on permanent presidential absences, a deliberate manipulation takes place. By introducing the idea that the current constitutional situation is one of Chavez’s “permanent absence”, the spot invites one to think that the correct legal step is for new elections to be called after 10 January. Yet Chavez’s status is not “permanent absence” and so it is actively misleading to equate that part of the constitution with the current situation, as Globovision does.

Globovision deploys the language of the president’s “permanent absence” and heavily promotes the notion of a “new election within thirty days” in a delicate political context. The opposition are arguing that the delay in Chavez’s swearing-in until after 10 January is a “violation” of the constitution and is a “coup d’état”, with sectors of the opposition declaring that they no longer recognise the legitimacy of the government. I have heard a few opposition supporters tell me that based on their (mistaken) understanding of the situation, “After 10 January, Chavez is no longer president,” and that new elections need to be called.

In such an atmosphere, there is definitely a case to be made that a media outlet repeatedly broadcasting an actively misleading set of quotes from the constitution which seem to cast the legitimacy of the government into question does indeed break several clauses within article 27 of Venezuela’s media responsibility law. The reality of the situation suggests that HRW’s stance has more to do with taking Globovision’s side in an argument with the government, rather than about a crusade for freedom of speech in Venezuela. Certainly, the opening of the administrative investigation into the spots hasn’t stopped Globovision from providing a platform for the same arguments through its numerous programs and commentators.

HRW also repeats the ridiculous claim that Globovision is the “only remaining television station with national coverage consistently critical of Chávez’s policies,” which is demonstrably false. The body also forgets to mention that the majority of both press and radio in Venezuela are privately owned, and generally critical of the government. Perhaps what HRW means is that Globovision is the only television station in Venezuela that purposefully manipulates information in a way that would not be tolerated in any Western country?

Federico Medina Ravell

The only other evidence that HRW can find to back its charges of “censorship” by the Venezuelan government is the case of tweeter Federico Medina Ravell. Medina’s house was searched on 6 January by officers of Venezuelan’s national intelligence service (Sebin) as part of “investigations into the instigation of terrorism via social networks, especially Twitter,” according to an official statement by Venezuela’s Attorney General.

Medina is assumed to be behind the Twitter name ‘Lucio Quincio C’, an account which propagates rumours about Chavez’s health and questions the legitimacy of the government. Several tweets appear to claim without basis that Chavez has already died, such as one message directed at a pro-Chavez supporter on 6 January which said, “Your owner is cold, he doesn’t have fever and is stable, he’s not moving”.

Federico Medina Ravell is described by Human Rights Watch as a “businessman”. Medina is in fact the cousin of Alberto Federico Ravell, one of the founders of Globovision, who now edits a Venezuelan news website called La Patilla. According to claims by pro-government journalist and TV host Mario Silva, Medina Ravell also counts prominent opposition political and media figures among his friends such as Henrique Capriles Radonski, Maria Corina Machado, and Antonio Ledezma.

HRW watch says that “Medina, who was not present at the time, said in an interview published online that the intelligence agents detained his wife and children for several hours and took two computers from his home”. This is true, but it doesn’t quite appear to be the heavy-handed security operation the HRW report suggests. According to Venezuelan news website Noticias24, the family had two lawyers present during the search, and neighbours were present as witnesses during questioning about Medina’s activities. Indeed, photos of Sebin officials conducting the search are available on a variety of news websites such as the one linked above.

The house search also doesn’t appear to have limited the freedom of expression of the twitter account ‘Lucio Quincio C’. For example, a 12 January tweet appeared to continue speculation of Chavez’s current state by saying “stop crying for your owner, I have offers on crowns and urns”.

Whether it was necessary for police to investigate Medina over the information propagated through the twitter account is definitely questionable. However, the action hardly amounts to the HRW charge of “limiting public discussion on issues of national importance”. Apart from brief coverage of the search itself, Venezuelan media haven’t said much on the matter. Considering that private media in Venezuela will use almost anything to criticise the government and try to find even the most flimsy basis for the cry of “restrictions on freedom of expression”, the fact that they haven’t reported much about this case suggests that even they consider it a non-starter.

Rather, it appears that HRW are grasping at straws in their attempt to create an inaccurate image of the current state of media, freedom of expression and public debate in Venezuela. Indeed, this would not be the first time that HRW has been accused of grossly misrepresenting human rights in Venezuela or committing howlers in their description of media and press freedoms in the country.

The reality inside Venezuela is that both government and opposition, and media outlets and citizens of all political stripes are freely arguing their point of view over Chavez’s health and the current constitutional situation. This includes some opposition leaders openly calling the current state of affairs a “coup” and announcing they no longer recognise the government. In such a context, a limited investigation into a media outlet enjoying a public concession which broadcasts actively misleading information about the constitution does not constitute “the limiting of public discussion” or “censorship”, as much as HRW would like to cast things otherwise.

In the likely event that Chavez dies, or is already dead, opposition leaders may incite demonstrations that have the potential to turn violent once the veil of despotism over the Venezuelan people is lifted. A divided post-Chavez political climate in Caracas could open the door for better ties with the Western world, however, given Maduro’s experience as a foreign diplomat and savvy negotiator.

But for an economy dependent in a poorly-managed oil sector, the best way to preserve the Chavez legacy may be without the man himself.

The Venezuelan Supreme Court ruled that the presidential term is a matter of continuity, allowing the cancer-stricken Chavez to continue through his 4th term in office, which he secured in October by narrowly beating rival Justice First party candidate Henrique Capriles.

The 58-year-old Chavez said he’d leave power in the hands of Maduro, his vice president and foreign minister.

During Maduro’s tenure as foreign minister, Caracas has moved closer to anti-western regimes like Gadhafi’s Libya, the dictatorship in Belarus and the fading Syrian regime of Bashar Assad. Long gone are the times when Caracas supported U.S. doctrine in Latin America, though even some Venezuelan leaders who’ve since moved to the opposition say Maduro’s role as a diplomat would make him at least tepid toward Washington should power remain in his hands.

U.S. Rep. Ileana Ros-Lehtinen, R-Fla., a staunch critic of Latin American despots, said the country’s Supreme Court is filled with “cronies” and who support the Chavez doctrine embraced by the “gangsters” in Caracas.  The 14-year period of resistance to Washington’s position in Latin America, however, can’t continue as it had without Chavez at the helm. Venezuela is divided deeply along political lines. And for the first time in Venezuelan history, an inauguration passed without the president, leaving the future as opaque as the government itself.

The economic legacy of Chavez, meanwhile, may be in his failure to administer some of the largest oil reserves in the world to his country’s favor. Oil production since 2001 has declined by more than 20 percent and exports have dropped by almost half of their 1997 levels, the year before Chavez took power. Oil, however, accounts for more than 90 percent of the country’s earnings from exports, makes up half of its budget revenues and accounts for 30 percent of its gross domestic product. This, coupled with oil industry woes, means any chance of financing the social programs that made Chavez a hero to some is unlikely to last.

In a quirk of fate, his legacy may best be preserved at this stage in the nation’s history by allowing the Chavez era to fade away.  Should global crude oil markets react strongly to his death, or formal transfer of power to Maduro, it’s likely to subside as did last year’s price spikes related to Iran. Chavez eradicated any opposition from the state-owned Petroleos de Venezuela, though that did little to bring in more revenue for a heavily-subsidized economy. A failing economic system is likely to continue no matter who takes control.

The Miraflores palace Thursday was noted not only for the absence of Chavez, but also for the pomp and circumstance that carried on without him. Capriles, the October presidential challenger, said there are no plans for major contention beyond sorting out the winners and losers in the post-Chavez climate.  While Maduro has at times referred to Western powers as “petty,” he may be the best hope – or at least most likely hope – not only for an international community hungry for Venezuela’s oil, but for a state system that depends on the durability of the state’s machismo, if not its Chavismo.